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Abstract
This paper looks into the determinants of the Swiss franc exchange rate against
the euro. Based on the monetary approach to exchange rates, we start from the
premise that monetary policy has an inﬂuence on the exchange rate. To measure
this effect, we apply the structural vector-autoregression methodology on a set of
Swiss macroeconomic variables and the euro area interest rate. Overall, we ﬁnd
that Swiss monetary policy contributes between 7 and 15% to variations of the
exchange rate between 1981 and 2008. Focusing on the episode between 2003 and
2005 we attribute more than half of the depreciation of the franc to Swiss monetary
policy.
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1. Introduction
This paper looks into the determinants of the exchange rate and asks the following
question: How does Swiss monetary policy contribute to movements in the Swiss franc
vis-à-vis the euro? To answer this question we rely on the intuitive notion that the
nominal exchange rate is the relative price of two currencies. Given that monetary
policy determines the value of a currency, it must have an inﬂuence on the nominal
exchange rate. This is the central idea behind the monetary approach to exchange
rates.
However, the monetary approach does not imply that monetary factors are the only
driving forces of exchange rates; rather it states that exchange rates are linked to fun-
damentals.1 Macroeconomic variables like money, interest rates, real output, the price
level, etc. have a potential effect on movements in the nominal exchange rate. We take
this as the starting point for our analysis and study the relationship between a set of
macroeconomic variables and the exchange rate. This may seem a bold venture as the
empirical literature has not been very successful at explaining or forecasting exchange
rates with observable macroeconomic variables. Frankel and Rose (1995) conclude in
the Handbook of International Economics: “...we, like much of the profession, are doubt-
ful of the value of further time-series modelling of exchange rates at high or medium
frequencies using macroeconomic models."
The difﬁculty in forecasting ﬂoating exchange rates has been effectively demon-
strated by Meese and Rogoff (1983), who showed that structural models do not out-
perform a random walk in forecasting monthly exchange rates. However, the fact that
exchange rates are difﬁcult to forecast does not imply that there is no link between
macroeconomic fundamentals and the foreign exchange market. Being an asset price,
the exchange rate is forward looking and expectations about future values of macro-
economic fundamentals have an inﬂuence on its current value. Hence, news inﬂuenc-
ing the expectations about macroeconomic variables has an immediate impact on the
exchange rate. Since news (or a change in expectations) is hard to observe, it is dif-
ﬁcult to establish the short-run empirical link between macroeconomic variables and
the exchange rate. This argument is put forward by Engel and West (2005), who show
analytically that models based on macroeconomic fundamentals might well result in
exchange rate behaviour which is empirically indistinguishable from a random walk.
In addition to this analytical argument there are some recent empirical studies who
ﬁnd evidence for the connection between changes in expectations about macroeco-
nomic variables and short-run movements in the exchange rate. Engel et al. (2007)
summarise this literature and demonstrate that using surveys to measure expectations
improves the forecasting ability of the monetary model. Focusing on a somewhat dif-
1This is the message from the original articles by Frenkel (1976) and Mussa (1976). Some authors see
it differently and describe the monetary approach by attributing all movements in the exchange rate to
money shocks.
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ferent point, Molodtsova et al. (2008) use real-time data and demonstrate that variables
which usually enter interest-rate-setting rules predict the US dollar/euro exchange
rate. They conclude that real-time data is more appropriate to forecast exchange rates
than revised data, because it captures the news driving the exchange rate.
Another strand of the literature has exploited the recent advances in panel cointe-
gration methods to establish stable long-run relationships between nominal exchange
rates and monetary fundamentals. Using this approach, Groen (2000) and Mark and
Sul (2001) ﬁnd that they can beat the random walk in forecasting nominal exchange
rates using the monetary model. More recently but using a similar approach, Cerra
and Saxena (2008) study a broad panel of 98 countries and conclude that there are
strong links between exchange rates and monetary fundamentals based on out-of-
sample forecasting results.
This paper does not attempt to forecast the exchange rate, its focus is rather on as-
sessing the relative importance of Swiss monetary policy shocks for the movements
of the euro/Swiss franc exchange rate. It is therefore related to work in the spirit of
Faust and Rogers (2003) and the literature cited therein, which tries to identify mone-
tary policy shocks in a small open economy using the structural vector-autoregression
(SVAR) framework. Typical questions regarding the inﬂuence of monetary policy on
the exchange rate in this context concern the shape of the impulse response function,
the relative contribution of monetary policy to the variability of the exchange rate, or
the size of possible deviations from uncovered interest rate parity (UIP). We add to
this literature by setting up an SVAR model using Swiss macroeconomic variables and
the euro area interest rate. We identify monetary policy shocks using a combination
of short- and long-run restrictions and study their inﬂuence on the euro/Swiss franc
exchange rate. Our main contribution is a detailed event study of exchange rate move-
ments and their driving forces. In particular, we provide an ex-post explanation of the
depreciation of the Swiss franc against the euro from 2003 to 2008 using a historical
decomposition of the exchange rate into monetary policy and other shocks. We ﬁnd
that the relatively loose monetary stance from 2003 to 2005 contributed substantially
to the weakness of the Swiss franc during this episode. However, since 2006 the effects
of monetary policy on the exchange rate have diminished substantially, most of the
variation in the Swiss franc-euro exchange rate is explained by non-monetary factors.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents a short overview of
the monetary approach to exchange rates. Then, we discuss some issues about measur-
ingmonetarypolicyinsmallopeneconomiesinSection3andoutlineouridentiﬁcation
strategy in Section 4. The empirical results on the driving forces behind the Swiss franc
movements are the subject of Section 5. In Section 6 we study the inﬂuence of mone-
tary policy for the large swings of the Swiss franc against the euro between 2003 and
2008. Finally, Section 7 draws some conclusions.
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2. The monetary approach to exchange rates
When Frenkel (1976) and Mussa (1976) formulated the monetary theory of exchange
rates, they stressed the importance of money as the cause of both, movements in the
price level and the nominal exchange rate. They observed that to understand the re-
lationship between exchange rates and prices, the common driving forces need to be
identiﬁed. To illustrate this point Frenkel (1976) studied the German hyperinﬂation
of the 1920s and argues that the close co-movement between the exchange rate and
the price level is clearly driven by an excessive supply of money. This observation is
the central building block of the monetary approach to exchange rates: Money growth
(relative to real output growth) in both countries is an important driver of nominal
exchange rate movements. A similar argument holds for the price levels and implies,
that the exchange rate and the relative price level follow the same long-run trend when
driven by monetary forces. This is best seen when inﬂation differentials are sizeable. In
environments with lower inﬂation rates, the co-movement between the relative price
level and the exchange rate is less pronounced than during hyperinﬂationary periods.
An example is given in Figure 1 which shows the relative price level and the exchange
rate for Switzerland and the euro area since 19822.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2Prior to the introduction of the euro in 1999, the German price level and the German mark-Swiss
franc exchange rate are used.
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Both series follow approximately the same long-run trend and, according to the
monetary approach to exchange rates, this trend is basically determined by monetary
policy in Switzerland and the euro area. The development of the relative price level
shows that inﬂation has been relatively high in Switzerland until 1991, thereafter the
Swiss National Bank (SNB) managed to keep inﬂation lower than in the euro area. We
also observe strong temporary deviations of the exchange rate from the relative price
level, which deserve a more detailed explanation of the transmission mechanism and
the role of expectations.
Regarding expectations, Mussa (1976) stressed that “...the relative prices of na-
tional monies are determined by forces which are similar to those which operate on
any asset market." As for any asset, expectations about future returns are crucial to de-
termine current prices. In the case of the foreign exchange market, it is the expectation
about the future monetary policies in both involved countries that plays a major role
for current exchange rate movements. With respect to the transmission mechanism of
monetary policy, Dornbusch (1976) focuses on the role of sticky prices to explain the
high volatility of exchange rates compared to relative price levels. His overshooting
model predicts the following reaction to a monetary easing: In the short run, the liq-
uidity effect implies that home interest rates fall, relative to foreign interest rates. To
compensate for the low domestic interest rate, UIP requires that the home currency is
expected to appreciate. On the other hand, the long-run link between the price level
and the exchange rate implies that loosening the monetary stance will lead to a long-
run weakening of the home currency. In order to be able to appreciate to a depreciated
value, the exchange rate must jump initially and therefore overshoots the long-run
level.
In spite of its appealing theoretical underpinnings, the monetary approach to ex-
change rates has suffered serious blows from the empirical literature. Two main cases
have been made against the idea that money is an important driver of the exchange
rate. First, starting with Meese and Rogoff (1983) a large body of literature has demon-
strated that monetary or real fundamentals, do not improve exchange rate forecasts.
This does not invalidate the monetary approach, it rather says that observable mac-
roeconomic fundamentals have no predictive power. Nevertheless, it might still be
the case that the exchange rate is driven by monetary policy shocks or other unob-
servables. The second case is the so-called PPP-Puzzle. As Rogoff (1996) argues in his
assessment of the literature on PPP, the slow adjustment of real exchange rates requires
implausible assumptions about price stickiness if monetary shocks are the main driver
of nominal exchange rates. This is a strong argument because despite the difﬁculties
in assessing the stationarity of real exchange rates empirically, many studies covering
different time periods and currencies share the ﬁnding of very slow mean reversion.
It is important to note that the monetary approach to exchange rates does not rely
on the assumption of relative PPP. In particular, it is not inconsistent with persistent or
even permanent movements of the real exchange rate. Rather, the monetary approach
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claims that monetary policy shocks in both countries should not affect the long-run
leveloftherealexchangeratebecausethatisdeterminedbyrealfactors. Thisneutrality
property is not a distinguishing feature of the monetary approach but holds for many
models in international ﬁnance like Obstfeld (1985) or Clarida and Galí (1994).
Summing up, our view is that the monetary approach in its sticky price version
makes three points: First, money, or more precisely, expectations about monetary pol-
icy play an important role in explaining exchange rate ﬂuctuations. Second, the ex-
change rate responds more quickly and more strongly to monetary policy shocks than
the price level because of sticky prices. However – this is the third point – in the long
run the exchange rate and the price level move by the same amount in response to a
monetary policy shock.
3. Measuring monetary policy
Structural vector autoregressions (SVARs) have been the most popular tool for mea-
suring monetary policy over the past years.3 An important advantage of this type
of model is that the variables which are of interest for monetary policy can be rep-
resented compactly and without imposing more structure than necessary. Following
this principle, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) were the ﬁrst to use the policy instrument
together with other macroeconomic variables in an SVAR model in order to measure
monetary policy. Their approach has been applied in many different variants and for
different countries with the main objective of separating monetary policy shocks from
systematic reactions of monetary policy to changes in macroeconomic conditions. The
typical strategy to identify monetary policy shocks in this context was to assume that
the policy variable reacts contemporaneously to the non-policy variables, i.e. the other
variables in the system, whereas the non-policy variables react only with a lag to the
policy variable. This recursive structure makes sense as long as the set of non-policy
variables does not contain stock prices, exchange rates or similar variables which are
supposed to react immediately to monetary policy shocks.
Whereas the early SVAR models were mostly applied to closed economies, it soon
became clear that their speciﬁcations were not well suited for measuring monetary
policy in open economies because they produced implausible results like the prize or
liquidity puzzles. Their main deﬁciency was that they did not take into account the fact
that the central banks of small open economies not only react to domestic but also to
foreign variables, in particular the exchange rate. Taking into account this considera-
tion, Cushman and Zha (1997) introduced an SVAR model for Canada which included
US variables. In order to overcome the estimation problems posed by the increased
number of variables, they assumed that Canada takes US economic conditions as given
or exogenous, which seems reasonable, given the relative sizes of the two economies.
3Other attempts to measure monetary policy include the narrative approach by Romer and Romer
(1998) or using interest rate futures on overnight funds by Rudebusch (1998).
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Following this reasoning, it has become common practice to include foreign vari-
ables in SVAR models which attempt to measure domestic monetary policy shocks
in small open economies. Different variable sets have been used to complement the
set of domestic variables, but most authors seem to agree about including at least a
short term interest rate and the exchange rate as in Smets (1997), Kim and Roubini
(2000), Faust and Rogers (2003), or Artis and Ehrmann (2006). The introduction of the
exchange rate in a small open economy SVAR model presents the challenge that the
identiﬁcation strategy has to allow for simultaneity between the domestic interest rate
and the exchange rate. It is not credible to assume that either of these variables does
not react to changes in the other within a month or even a quarter. This is particu-
larly true in the present case where we want to assess the reaction of the exchange rate
to monetary policy shocks. Restricting the short-run interaction between these two
variables is likely to lead to misleading results. We present a possible solution to this
problem in the next section.
4. Structural Identiﬁcation
Our identiﬁcation strategy is based on the idea of Artis and Ehrmann (2006) and con-
sists of setting up an SVAR model for Switzerland with the following ﬁve variables:
Swiss real output (y), the Swiss franc 3M-Libor (i), Swiss inﬂation (π), the 3M-Euribor
(i∗), and the exchange rate in euros per Swiss franc (e). A similar variable set has re-
cently been used by Bjørnland (2008) for Norway with the only difference that she
replaces the nominal with the real exchange rate. We collect these macroeconomic
variables in the vector xt = [∆yt, i∗
t, πt, ∆et, it]￿ and set up the VAR model
xt = B(L)xt−1 + ut, (1)
where B(L) = B1 + ... + BpLp−1 is a polynomial in the lag-operator and ut is a 5 × 1
vector of reduced form disturbances with covariance matrix Ω. Assuming xt to be
invertible, it can be represented as a vector moving average (VMA):
xt = D(L)ut, (2)
where D(L) = ∑
∞
i=0 DiLi.
Following the usual approach in the literature, the structural form of (2) is obtained
by replacing the reduced form disturbances ut with a linear combination of the struc-
tural shocks εt:
xt = D(L)C0εt. (3)
As D0 is the identity matrix, C0 represents the contemporaneous effects of the struc-
turalshocksonthevariablesin xt. Thelaggedeffects, thatistheimpulseresponsefunc-
tions, are given by Ci = DiC0. In order to identify the structural model we ﬁrst estimate
the reduced form VAR which yields estimates for B(L), Ω and D(L) = (I − B(L)L)−1.
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Second, we impose 25 restrictions on the elements of C0 which allows the calculation
of the structural form according to (3).
Assuming uncorrelated structural shocks with unit variance implies C0C￿
0 = Ω and
yields15restrictions. The10additionalrestrictionsareplacedonthecontemporaneous
and long-run effects of the structural shocks. To this end it is useful to have a mean-
ingful interpretation for all structural shocks, even though we are mainly interested in
the monetary policy shock. In accordance with the suggestion by Artis and Ehrmann






where the superscripts denote a supply, a demand, a foreign money, an exchange rate,
and a home money shock.
We identify the supply shock, as the only shock which has a permanent effect on
Swiss real GDP, this yields four long-run restrictions. Then, we impose three additional
restrictions which separate the demand shock from the other shocks with only tempo-
rary effects on real GDP. This is done assuming that the demand shock is the only of
thesewhichcancontemporaneouslyaffectrealGDP.Thenexttworestrictionsstatethat
the 3M-Euribor does not react immediately to exchange rate or Swiss monetary shocks
and identiﬁes the euro area monetary policy. Supposing that the 3M-Euribor reﬂects
at least to some extent the actions of the ECB, this means on the one hand that the ECB
does probably not care very much about the euro/Swiss franc exchange rate or Swiss
monetary policy shocks. On the other hand, it implies that the ECB reacts immedi-
ately to supply and demand shocks. This makes sense given that supply and demand
shocks affecting Switzerland are most likely the same shocks affecting the surround-
ing countries at the same time. Finally, we need one additional restriction to separate
the exchange rate from the Swiss monetary policy shock. Given the arguments brought
forward in the preceding section, assuming a recursive ordering between the 3M-Libor
and the exchange rate is not feasible. In order to identify the monetary policy shock,
we therefore assume that its long-run effect on the exchange rate and the price level
is identical in absolute value. This is in line with the monetary approach to the ex-
change rate: A monetary expansion in Switzerland increases the Swiss price level and
depreciates the Swiss franc by the same amount without affecting the euro area price
level; this leaves the real exchange rate unchanged in the long run. Summing up, these
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where z is an arbitrary number representing the long-run effect of the monetary shock
on the price level and the nominal exchange rate in absolute value. The nine zero
restrictions are the same as those imposed by Artis and Ehrmann (2006), the tenth
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restriction is very similar to the one used by Bjørnland (2008).
We estimate (1) with monthly data covering February 1981 to September 2008 and
including four lags. Applying the above identiﬁcation procedure yields the responses
of all variables to a one-standard-deviation shock. Figure 2 shows the responses to an
expansive monetary policy shock in Switzerland which seems correctly identiﬁed as
it has the expected effects: A temporary increase of real output, a short-run liquidity
effect in Switzerland, a depreciation of the Swiss franc with a short-run undershooting,
and a permanent increase in the price level. Note that the undershooting of the nom-
inal exchange rate is slightly delayed, the maximum depreciation is attained after one
month. The price level reacts strongly on impact, which indicates that price ﬂexibility,
at least with respect to monetary policy shocks, is quite high.
Figure 2: Impulse response functions
Responses to an expansionary monetary policy shock
in percent
Log real output
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shocks we do not present the responses to the other shocks. However, it might be
noted that the labels we gave them are mostly reasonable given their overall effects on
the considered variables. It is also worth pointing out that the monetary policy shocks
are the only shocks with a substantial permanent effect on both, the price level and the
exchange rate. This implies that monetary policy is the only common driver of these
two variables in the long-run.
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5. The contribution of monetary policy shocks to exchange rate changes
To assess the relative contribution of the considered shocks to the volatility of exchange
rate changes we present the corresponding variance decomposition in Table 1. Again
we are not particularly interested in the detailed contribution of the other shocks, but
we note that our an exchange rate shock explains by far most of the variance of ex-
change rate changes. The monetary policy shock explains about 7% percent of the
long-run exchange rate variance. Focusing on the short-run we see that this contribu-
tion reaches a maximum of about 15% at the 3 month horizon. This relatively small
contribution of monetary policy shocks to exchange rate movements is in line with the
PPP-Puzzle: If exchange rate shocks, which have only a small inﬂuence on prices, are
an important driver of the nominal exchange rate, real and nominal exchange rates
must move closely together.
Table 1: Variance decomposition of euro/Swiss franc exchange rate change
Contribution of
Horizon εs εd εm∗
εe εm
1 9.10 7.12 10.66 66.36 6.77
2 5.61 5.12 5.61 70.78 12.87
3 3.86 3.96 3.61 73.60 14.96
6 2.64 2.20 2.19 79.75 13.22
12 2.86 1.28 1.28 84.76 9.82
24 2.83 0.69 1.14 87.28 8.06
36 2.52 0.59 1.17 88.30 7.41
60 1.85 0.99 0.98 89.30 6.88
A different way of assessing the relative importance of monetary policy shocks for
exchange rate movements can be obtained from the historical decomposition. We focus
on the annual percentage changes of the exchange rate because we are interested in the
contribution of the medium term monetary policy stance to exchange rate movements
rather than that of single monetary policy shocks. Given the VMA representation of
the exchange rate changes
∆et = c(L)εt, (5)
where c(L) is the fourth row of D(L)C0 in (3), we can compute the corresponding VMA
representation for the annual rate of change:
∆12et = c0εt+(c0+c1)εt−1+...+(c0+...+c11)εt−11+(c1+...+c12)εt−12+... (6)
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According to the impulse response function it takes about 12 months for the monetary
policy shocks to develop their full effect on the exchange rate. We therefore truncate
the VMA representation (6) after 12 lags which yields the approximation:
∆12et ￿ γ12(L)εt, (7)
where γ12(L) = c0 + (c0 + c1)L + ... + (c0 + ... + c11)L11. Decomposing the vector of
structural shocks between εt into the monetary policy shock εm
t and the other shocks εo
t






This decomposition of the annual exchange rate changes into the contribution of last
year’s monetary policy and other shocks is depicted in Figure 3. It shows that the
approximation (8) is accurate which implies that the effect of shocks older than one
year is mostly negligible.
















































































































































































Figure 3 conﬁrms the results of the variance decomposition with respect to the rel-
ative contribution of monetary policy shocks. However, even though the overall the
annual exchange rate change is mainly driven by other shocks, there are some periods
1112
where the monetary policy shocks contributed substantially to exchange rate move-
ments. A ﬁrst episode is the Swiss franc appreciation in 1994, which would have been
much less persistent without the tight monetary stance. A few years later, in 1998 and
1999, monetary policy had again a relatively strong inﬂuence on the exchange rate. In
this episode the monetary policy shocks worked mostly in the opposite direction of the
other shocks which lead to a rather low volatility of the Swiss franc against the euro.
A last interesting example is the episode from 2003 to mid 2006, where the monetary
stance was rather loose according to our decomposition. Whereas in 2003 the main
driver of the Swiss franc depreciation were the other shocks, in 2004 the expansionary
monetary policy prevented a stronger appreciation of the Swiss franc. Finally from
2005 to mid 2006 the easy monetary stance contributed substantially to the weakening
of the franc.
6. An event study of Swiss franc movements between 2003 and 2008
In this section, we answer the question raised at the beginning of the paper: How does
Swiss monetary policy contribute to movements in the Swiss franc vis-á-vis the euro?
The variance decomposition and the historical decompositions of the annual exchange
rate changes in the preceding section gave a general answer to this question for the
complete sample and we have seen that the long-run contribution of monetary policy
shocks to exchange rate variability is below 10 %. However, this does not preclude
that in certain episodes with important monetary policy shocks, they make a larger
contribution to exchange rate movements.
We analyse the period 2003-2008 and split this period into three episodes which
are related to the level of the Swiss franc 3M-Libor. Figure 4 shows the correspond-
ing movements of the 3M-Libor and the euro/Swiss franc exchange. The ﬁrst episode
runs from March 2003 to December 2005. In March 2003 the midpoint for the 3M-Libor
target was set at 0.25% and it remained below 1% until December 2005 with only two
25 basis points hikes in between. This low level of the 3M-Libor was clearly associated
with an expansive monetary stance and apparently contributed to a depreciation of the
Swiss franc according to the monetary approach to exchange rates. A second episode
starts in December 2005, with the ﬁrst of eight consecutive 25-basis-point hikes in the
3M-Libor. During this episode, monetary conditions were getting tighter but the de-
preciation of the Swiss franc continues. This episode ends in October 2007, when the
Swiss franc attained its historical low against the euro. The last episode runs from
November 2007 to the end of 2008 and covers the market turmoil related to the sub-
prime crisis and the subsequent ﬁnancial crisis. During this period the Swiss franc
appreciated by about 8%. The SNB kept the 3M-Libor target at 2.75% until October
2008, in the last quarter of 2008 the target was cut in four steps to 0.5%.
1213
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Even though the movements of the 3M-Libor in Figure 4 already give some rough
information about the stance of monetary policy the picture is not complete unless we
reﬁne the analysis. In particular, the movements of the 3M-Libor need to be disen-
tangled into endogenous policy reactions and policy shocks. Doing so allows us to
answer the two main questions we are interested in: How did Swiss monetary policy
affect the Swiss franc during its depreciation against the euro between 2003 and 2007?
Has there been an inﬂuence of Swiss monetary policy on the exchange rate during the
recent appreciation of the Swiss franc?
To answer these questions we use again the structural VMA representation of the
exchange rate. Given its value at some point in time τ, the future development is
driven by the dynamic effects of the shocks occurring after τ and the persistence of
all shocks which hit the exchange rate up to τ. This follows directly from repeatedly
substituting in (5):
eτ+1 = eτ + c0ετ+1 + c1ετ + c2ετ−1 + ...
eτ+2 = eτ + c0ετ+2 + (c0 + c1)ετ+1 + (c1 + c2)ετ + ...
. . .
eτ+s = eτ + c0ετ+s + ... + (c0 + ... + cs−1)ετ+1 + (c1 + ... + cs)ετ + ...
This can be written more compactly as:
eτ+s = eτ + γs(L)ετ+s + ˜ cs(L)ετ, (9)
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where ˜ cs(L) contains the effects of the shocks up to τ. Note that γs(L) is of order s − 1
whereas ˜ cs(L) is of inﬁnite order. Again, we decompose the vector of structural shocks
between τ +1 and τ +s into the monetary policy shock εm
t and the other shocks εo
t with
their corresponding coefﬁcients:




τ+s + ˜ cs(L)ετ. (10)
This decomposition can readily be calculated given the structural VMA representation
and allows to break apart the movement of the exchange during a particular episode
starting in τ + 1 and ending in τ + s into three components: The contribution of ongo-
ing monetary policy shocks, other ongoing shocks, and past shocks. Ongoing shocks
are those that occur within the period of interest (between τ + 1 and τ + s), while past
shocksare thosethatarose priortothis period.4 Wedo notdisentanglethe contribution
of past shocks into monetary and other shocks in order to keep the analysis focused.5






































































































































































Figure 5 presents the movements in the exchange rate, measured in terms of eu-
ros against Swiss francs and expressed as a percentage, starting in March 2003. The
bold line shows that the Swiss franc had depreciated by about 5% by December 2006.
The bars represent the cumulative contributions of ongoing monetary policy shocks,
4Note that the effects of the ongoing shocks consists of the shocks occurring at the current date plus
the accumulated effects of the shocks between the starting date and the current date.
5The empirical results show that the effects from the past shocks are small compared to the ongoing
shocks. Of course, this reﬂects that forecasting the exchange rate is difﬁcult.
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other ongoing shocks and past shocks. We observe that the loose monetary stance is
making an increasing contribution to the depreciation of the Swiss franc especially to-
wards the end of this episode. Whereas, until mid 2004, other shocks contribute more
to the depreciation, monetary shocks become the predominant cause for the down-
ward movement in early 2005. By the end of 2005 their cumulative contribution to the
weakness of the Swiss franc is clearly larger than that of the other shocks. Putting it
differently, this means that about half of the Swiss franc depreciation against the euro
in this episode was due to the relatively loose monetary policy stance from 2003 to
2005.

























































































































































The analysis of the subsequent episode leads to a different conclusion. Figure 6
shows that from December 2005 to October 2007, the Swiss franc depreciates by about
8% against the euro. Even though there is only a slight downward movement in the
ﬁrst few months, the monetary policy shocks play some role until June 2006. Their rela-
tive importance then decreases, and from October 2006 their contribution even favours
an appreciation, if only weakly. The largest contribution to the strong depreciation of
the Swiss franc in the ﬁnal two years of this episode clearly comes from the other
shocks. Taking into account that during this episode the SNB continuously increased
the 3M-Libor by 25 basis points on a quarterly basis, this might be surprising. How-
ever, our analysis indicates, that this interest rate hikes were largely expected and in
line with the usual response to macroeconomic conditions, hence they hardly affected
the exchange rate.
Overall, we see that, according to the SVAR analysis, both monetary and other
1516
shocks contributed to the depreciation of the Swiss franc between 2003 and 2007. How-
ever, the main contribution to this depreciation clearly came from the other shocks,
the inﬂuence of monetary policy shocks was limited to a short period. This immedi-
ately raises the question as to the nature of the other shocks. Our suggestion from the
structural identiﬁcation in Section 2 points to aggregate supply and demand, foreign
monetary policy and exchange rate shocks as possible candidates. The variance de-
composition attributes the largest importance to exchange rate shocks. We interpret
these shocks as being mostly foreign exchange market disturbances representing real
exchange rate changes, carry trades, safe haven effects, and the like. The clear tendency
of the Swiss franc to depreciate together with its relatively low volatility and an inter-
est rate differential in favor of the euro points to the carry trade as the main source of
exchange rate shocks in 2006 and 2007, but this point deserves clearly more attention.
The second question we tackle in this section concerns the movements in the Swiss
franc-euro exchange rate towards the end 2007 and in 2008. In particular, we would
like to know whether monetary policy played an role for the recent appreciation of the
Swiss franc. In addition we provide some information about the likely development of
the Swiss franc in absence of the interest rate cuts in the last quarter of 2008.















































































































































































































































Figure 7 presents the corresponding results and shows that the 5% appreciation of
the Swiss franc from October 2007 to October 2008 cannot be attributed to monetary
policy shocks because the policy stance has been slightly expansive, especially in mid
2008. Again, the movement of the exchange rate is mainly driven by other shocks,
in the present case we favour an explanation in terms of save haven shocks due to
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the subprime crisis.6 This safe haven effects become stronger after September 2008,
when the subprime crisis developed into a ﬁnancial crisis after the Lehman Brothers
collapse. Note that in November and December 2008 our analysis indicates a slight
tightening of the monetary stance even though the 3M-Libor target was cut by a total of
200 basis points. This is possibly surprising as it means that monetary conditions were
tighter than expected given the prevalent situation, especially the strong appreciation
of the Swiss franc in September and October. An explanation for this result is that
the measurement of monetary policy shocks has been impaired because the actual 3M-
Libor was mostly above the target due to higher risk premia.
In order to shed some more light on the effects of the policy actions in the last
quarter we conduct a simple counterfactual experiment and ask the question: What
would have happened to the exchange rate if the SNB had decided to keep the 3M-
Libor unchanged at a value of 2.75% for the last quarter of 2008? This amounts to feed
three monetary policy shocks into the VAR system in order to keep the interest rate
constant given the measured values for the other structural shocks. Of course, such
an experiment constitutes a clear deviation from the usual conduct of monetary policy
and is therefore subject to the Lucas’ critique. Keeping this in mind it is still instructive
to have a look at the results of this exercise in Figure 8.
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Whereas the ﬁrst shock in September is slightly expansionary because the actual
3M-Libor is slightly above the target value, the shocks in November and December
6Ranaldo and Söderlind (2007) show with high-frequency data that the Swiss franc has safe haven
properties against the euro and other currencies in times of ﬁnancial turbulence.
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have a strong contractive effect. The exchange rate appreciates strongly and exceeds
the actual value by 6% in December. The monetary policy shocks end up explaining
about half of the overall appreciation between October 2007 and December 2008.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we analyse the contribution of Swiss monetary policy to movements in
the Swiss franc against the euro. In particular, we measure the relative contribution
of monetary policy versus other factors to the depreciation of the Swiss franc between
2003 and 2007 and to the appreciation in 2008. The empirical results of this exercise
lead us to the following conclusions: First, the average contribution of monetary policy
shocks to ﬂuctuations in the exchange rate is between 7% and 15% for the period 1981
to 2007. Second, our results indicate that the monetary stance was relatively loose from
2003 to 2005. This monetary expansion was responsible for about 3% of the 5% depreci-
ation of the Swiss franc against the euro between 2003 and 2005. Third, since 2006 the
effects of monetary policy on the exchange rate have diminished substantially, most
of the variation in the Swiss franc-euro exchange rate is explained by non-monetary
factors.
Three caveats need to be mentioned with respect to these results. One is related to
the econometric methodology applied to measure monetary policy shocks. It relies on
the assumption that there has not been a fundamental change in the monetary policy
regime over the estimation period. In our opinion this assumption is correct for the
considered time interval, in particular with respect to the primary objective of Swiss
monetary policy. Even though the operating procedure has substantially changed,
Swiss monetary policy has been directed towards maintaining low and stable inﬂation
rates since the transition to ﬂexible exchange rates. The second caveat concerns the
interpretation of the exchange rate movements, which are not related to Swiss mon-
etary policy. We interpret these shocks tentatively as representing real exchange rate
changes, carry trades, safe haven effects, foreign monetary policy and the like. How-
ever, we do not attempt to provide a more detailed breakdown. Finally, the focus of
the study is on the analysis of historical episodes and not on the medium or long-run
forecast of the exchange rate. In particular, it does not concentrate on the long-run
appreciation trend of the Swiss franc against the euro, which is due to the inﬂation dif-
ferential and movements in the real-exchange, but on the deviations from this trend.
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